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Abstract—One of the main problems in open wireless networks
is the inability of authenticating the identity of a wireless client
or Access Point (AP). This issue is a concern because, a malicious
entity could masquerade as the legal AP and entice a wireless
client to establish a connection with a Rogue AP. Previous
work by the authors has developed the algorithms used in this
work but, in contrast to prior work, there was no analysis
or experimentation with Rogue AP attacks. Our purpose in
this work is to detect injection type of Rogue AP activity by
identifying whether a frame is genuinely transmitted by the
legal AP or not. To this end, an identity profile for the legal
AP is built by fusing multi-layer metrics, using the Dempster-
Shafer algorithm. The results show high detection results with low
false alarms for detecting Rogue AP attacks without requiring
configuration from an administrator.
Index Terms—Rogue AP, Cross-layer measurements, data
fusion, Dempster-Shafer, Wi-Fi
I. INTRODUCTION
IN recent years, wireless communication has become ubiq-uitous and is currently the most convenient way of ac-
cessing the Internet for millions of people worldwide. The
broadcast nature of wireless networks makes them inherently
less secure compared to wired networks. Wireless connectivity
provides numerous advantages compared to wired networks
such as mobility, flexibility, and remote access. However, they
are also posing serious vulnerabilities in the wireless network
protocol, particularly in the Physical (PHY) and Medium
Access Control (MAC) Layers. Due to these vulnerabilities,
wireless users are exposed to an increasing number of sophis-
ticated, easy to launch attacks with the goal of financial gain
or private information retrieval.
One of the main security issues in open wireless networks is
the inability of authentication between an Access Point (AP)
and its clients. Authentication schemes, such as Extensible Au-
thentication Protocol (EAP), are focusing on closed network
environments, like organisations and companies, but are not
appropriate solution for open public networks, such as hotspots
in airports or coffee shops. In the latter case, the number and
identity of clients change dynamically and can not be either
predetermined or preconfigured as this would harm flexibility
and convenience to users.
The inability of authenticating the identity of a wireless
user is a concern because, a malicious entity could masquerade
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itself as the legal AP enticing wireless users to establish a con-
nection and then hijacking the communication link between
the users and the Internet. This type of attack is known as a
“Rogue AP” (RAP) attack and allows the attacker to breach
the security of the client’s communication to the Internet.
Most of the Industry solutions addressing this problem are
analysing the wireless side traffic gathering statistics from
signal strength values in control and management frames
received by the wireless client to help detect and localise
RAPs. In contrast, the academia has mostly focused on the
wired side techniques based on temporal traffic characteristics
[1]. The authors in [1] are considering that the ultimate
goal of detection schemes would be based on an irrefutable
device identification mechanism through the collection and
analysis of intrinsic traffic characteristics. In other words
the identification process should be based on attributes and
characteristics that are not dependent on the reported identity,
such as MAC address [2].
However, there are several drawbacks associated with the
above solutions. The ones that are based on the wireless
side either focus on just one layer of observation (e.g. MAC
layer) or use a limited number of metrics without intelligently
combining the knowledge derived from each metric. On the
other hand, the solutions that only consider the wired side, do
not take advantage of the PHY and MAC layer information of
WLANs [1], [2].
To address the above shortcomings, our proposed work is
using metrics from the PHY up to the Network layers, in a
synergistic manner. The power of multiple metrics is harnessed
by using the Dempster-Shafer (D-S) as a belief fusion algo-
rithm. Previous work by the authors [3], [4] has described the
algorithms used throughout this paper but, in contrast to prior
work, there was no analysis or experimentation with Rogue
AP attacks as is the focus in this work.
The advantage of our approach in comparison to conven-
tional methods is that by using multi-layer measurements on a
frame-by-frame basis, the attack can be detected at the instance
it is actually launched. In contrast, other techniques, such as
[5], are based on counting the number of malicious frames and
when this surpasses a threshold, an alarm is triggered. There
are two problems associated with such conventional methods.
First, an attacker might be aware of such detection techniques
and cunningly control the number of injected frames per time
interval. And secondly, such approach allows for the malicious
frames to reach the victim until the threshold is exceeded [6].
The contribution of this work is:
• Use of data fusion on multiple metrics from multi-layers
to detect injection type of RAP attacks.
• Evaluation of methodology using data from a real IEEE
802.11 network under RAP attack.
• The evaluation of the results is based on Detection Rate
(DR), False Positive (FP), False Negatives (FN) and
average time to complete the detection since the attack
took place.
• Analysis of experiments using two methodologies for
assigning the beliefs in the D-S algorithm.
• We make available the utilised measurement
datasets for researchers to compare results at
http://homepages.lboro.ac.uk/∼elkk/Site/Testbed data.html
The paper is organised as follows. A description of the the-
oretical background on D-S and the associated belief assign-
ment schemes are presented in Section II. A description and
implementation of the Rogue AP attack and the testbed where
the experiments took place are presented in Sections III-A
and III-B respectively. The procedure of our methodology is
presented in Section III-C. In Section IV are discussed the
attack experiment results, which are analysed with different
versions of our algorithms. Finally, conclusions and future
work are given in Section V.
II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Data fusion can be defined as the process of collecting
information from multiple and heterogeneous sources, and
combining them toward obtaining a more accurate final result
[7]. There exist different mechanisms for the purpose of
data fusion, such as D-S, Bayesian Theory, and Principle
Component Analysis. The D-S theory of evidence is a good
candidate for this purpose because it does not require a priori
knowledge of the system, and provides the ability of managing
uncertainty. In contrast, Bayesian inference requires a priori
knowledge and does not allow allocation of probability to
ignorance but only to an event being normal or abnormal [8].
D-S theory has been previously used in the intrusion detection
field to enhance the detection accuracy [7], [9], [10].
For a more detailed description of D-S theory and math-
ematical foundations the reader can read Appendix A or, for
extensive practical explanations, our previous publications [3],
[4], [6].
A. Belief Assignment
A major challenge for applying D-S theory on IDS is to
determine the beliefs of whether an event is malicious or not
(i.e. define the mass probability functions m as described in
Appendix A), from the collected network measurements [11].
Even though there are multiple ways of assigning probabilities
to each of the hypotheses in D-S theory, few of them could
be used off-the-shelf without a prior training or fine tuning
period.
We have considered two distinct mechanisms for this
purpose. One based on experimentally assigning the beliefs
in the considered hypotheses (manual) and the other based
on an algorithm that automatically assigns the beliefs with
light training (automatic). For the automatic belief assignment
mechanism, the reader is referred to Appendix B or to our
previous papers [3], [4], [6] for further details.
Regarding the manual methodology, the beliefs for “Attack”
for each of the selected metrics (described later in Section
III-C ) are chosen experimentally and intuitively i.e. the bigger
the difference from a historical reference, the higher the belief
in the attack (see Fig. 1). The historical reference for each
metric is the mean of the metric values collected in a window
size of 30 frames. An analysis for the optimum window size
can be found in [12].
III. METHODOLOGY
A. Attack Description
We are launching a hijacking type of Rogue AP attack in
which the attacker is able to take over the communication
between the legitimate AP and wireless devices. One way of
luring a client to connect to a Rogue AP is by injecting Beacon
and Probe response frames using stronger signal strength than
the legitimate AP, since the wireless devices try to associate
to the AP with the strongest signal strength [13]. Once the
attacker has taken over the wireless communication, it has
complete control of the unencrypted communication link to
the Internet [14].
B. Testbed
In order to evaluate our proposed algorithm under Rogue
AP attacks, we set up the following real test-bed. A genuine
wireless AP by Liksys was used to provide internet connection
to a client running Ubuntu Linux 12.04. The attacker was
running the BackTrack operating system, using an Atheros
wireless card with AR5213A chipset and ath5k drivers. Fi-
nally, a monitoring node was utilised to measure the traffic
passing through the network, configured on a specific channel.
The tool responsible for monitoring and capturing the wireless
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Fig. 1. Manual BPA Functions for the RSSI and Rate metrics
traffic was Wireshark [15] and the log files are stored in
pcap format [16]. The tool used for the Rogue AP attack was
HostAPd [17].
C. Procedure
Even though our tool is able to run on-line and can detect
malicious frames in real-time, it also requires to preselect
a particular algorithm; either the manual or the automatic
method and also to preselect which metrics should be utilised
for the detection. In order to compare multiple options, such
as both types of algorithms under all possible metric com-
binations and during the same experiment, the analysis of
the collected measurement files was done off-line, iteratively
choosing all possible combinations.
Several metrics have been experimentally identified, and
used in this work, that could indicate an ongoing attack at
the PHY and MAC layers. These metrics are: The Received
Signal Strength Indication (RSSI), the transmission rate (or
data rate), the Network Allocation Vector (NAV), the Sequence
number, and the Time To Live value (TTL). The RSSI is
related to the Physical layer and is an indication of the received
signal strength. The data rate is the rate with which a frame
is transmitted. The NAV value indicates, depending on a the
frame and the hardware, how long will the channel be occupied
until the end of transmission. Finally, the TTL value is a metric
indicating the number of routers passed since an IP packet
started its journey towards the destination [4]. The collected
metrics are analysed and compared to historical data and each
metric gives a belief of whether an attack takes place or not.
It should be noted that it is important to understand how
one needs to filter the frames from which the metrics will be
extracted. In our experiments, the filter that was used was “any
frame coming from the legal AP MAC address and destined
to the MAC address of the monitored client or Broadcast”.
The developed tool can analyse management or data frames.
In the case of data frames, the additional network layer is
offering information (TTL metric) to assist in the detection of
malicious frames.
IV. RESULTS
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed
methodologies, the results from the two multi-layer techniques
are compared against each other (manual vs automatic both
with the mean statistic as reference), and for each methodology
all possible metric combinations are examined. That is equal
to 32 metric combinations. The results are evaluated by con-
structing the false negative rate FNR = FNTP+FN (where TP is
True Positives), false positive rate FPR = FPTotal captured Frames ,
and the DR = TPTP+FN .
Moving on the examination of the Rogue AP pcap files, it
should be noted that, generally, it is not possible to detect this
attack just from the management frames apart from when using
few specific metrics, and still with high FP. These cases in-
clude the metrics: RSSI, NAV and Sequence number (see Fig.
2). The Manual method, when analysing just the management
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Fig. 2. Results for Rogue AP attack using Automatic method and considering
management frames only.
frames, presents similar results with the Automatic method but
the results are not included due to space restrictions.
It should be noted that our proposed methodology is a
statistical approach and whenever the attacker injects frames
where the values of metrics coincide with those from the legal
AP, the malicious frames will be statistically indistinguishable
from the legal ones. As a general rule, the majority of metrics
will need to be statistically indistinguishable from the collected
historical data constructed from legal frames. Because the
management frames do not provide adequate metrics that are
statistically different from those of the legal AP, in order to
detect the Rogue AP attack, we need to use data frames where
the extra metric of TTL is included. Note that for other types
of attacks, the use of management frames is sufficient and in
some cases (with WPA2 encryption), the only option [6].
Figures 3 and 4 depict the results for the manual and au-
tomatic method respectively considering just the data frames.
The results with the Manual approach are lacking in terms
of DR in comparison to those of the Automatic method,
especially in the last case of using all possible metrics together.
Even though the Manual methodology might have performed
well in prior experiments by the authors targeting other attack
techniques (eg. Airpwn see [3], [4], [6]), in the case of Rogue
AP detection the Manual method fails in most cases with the
exception of several metric combinations. This highlights the
importance of having an adjustable algorithm to assign the
beliefs that can be adapted to various types of attacks and
not be customised for some particular scenario. In contrast
with the Manual method of assigning beliefs, the automatic
BPA works in all attack scenarios without the requirement
of painstakingly setting the beliefs beforehand by running
multiple experiments.
The best results using the Automatic approach are gathered
in Table I. The best results indicate that NAV is a powerful
metric under this scenario and that the combination of all
metrics also achieves good overall results. It should be noted
that in most cases the malicious frames have been detected
in less than 100 µsec from the time they have been captured
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Fig. 3. Results for Rogue AP attack using Manual method and considering
data frames
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Fig. 4. Results for Rogue AP attack using Automatic method and considering
data frames
by the monitoring computer. This result is consistent with our
previous work applied in other cases of wireless attacks[6].
There are cases where the use of a single metric, in this
case NAV, can surpass the performance of dual or triple metric
combinations in the automatic method. In fact, the use of NAV
results in perfect detection, with 100% of DR and 0% of FP.
The dominance of this metric in such cases can be explained
due to the hardware difference between the Rogue AP and the
legal AP.
Similarly to the RSSI, different hardware vendors and
software drivers, estimate the NAV field each with their own
methodology. The NAV field is influenced primarily by the
Transmission Rate followed by the length of the transmitted
frame. Even if the transmitted frame is identical between
the Rogue AP and the legal AP, the NAV value is likely
to be different if hardware differences exist between them.
Therefore, different hardware might have different NAV field
for transmitting a particular frame and that inconsistency could
help towards detecting a malicious activity. This is the case in
that particular experiment.
It could be argued that such an attack could easily be
detected by simply looking at one particular metric (NAV
in this case). However, this is true if the NAV value as-
signment mechanism between the Rogue AP and the legal
AP is different, in which case the NAV value will become
a distinctive characteristics between the two APs. There are
chances where the attacker might be cunning enough (for
example by examining the traffic of the legal AP beforehand),
or lucky enough, to choose appropriate hardware to emulate
the NAV assignment scheme of the legal AP. Furthermore,
depending only on one metric makes sense only if that specific
attack is expected and the identifying metric is already known.
Otherwise, by depending on a specific metric, attacks that do
not manifest with that specific metric, will remain undetected.
Therefore, the use of multiple metrics is preferred because it
increases the number of characteristics the attacker needs to
emulate and also covers a wider range of possible attacks.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper discusses the concept and implementation pro-
cedure of launching a hijacking type of Rogue AP attack and
investigates methods of detecting such an attack by trying to
establish an identity for the legal AP using statistical character-
istics derived from the measured and collected traffic metrics.
The identified metrics that are tracked to build an identity
for the authentic AP are the RSSI, Data Rate, NAV, Sequence
Number and TTL fields of the IP stack. There is a high success
in detection rate when using all possible metrics. Furthermore,
the use of an automatic belief assignment mechanism, leads
to an adjustable system, that performs well in various attack
scenarios without requiring tuning by a network administrator.
Because the proposed algorithms are based on statistical
approaches, it is essential that the frames injected by the
Rogue AP are statistically distinguishable from those of the
legal AP. If the attacker manages to successfully emulate the
metric values and perfectly conceal the malicious traffic, then
the chances of successful detection are very low. However,
it is quite difficult and impractical for an attacker to actu-
ally emulate all the different characteristics, especially when
injecting data frames which require emulation of additional
metrics in the higher layers of the IP stack. Furthermore, such
a perfectly concealed malicious behaviour would be practically
undetectable by any other means.
Depending on the type of attack, the injected frames might
be management or data frames. We conclude that some attacks
are more appropriately detected by analysing just the manage-
ment frames and other attacks require more information and
should be analysed by looking at the data fames.
As for future work, we are in the process of finding ways
to automatically select appropriate metric combinations and
avoid relying on using all of the metrics simultaneously.
Ideally, the algorithm should rely on using only metrics that
give high confidence no matter what the belief is. This would
help in avoiding scenarios where the detection of malicious
TABLE I
RESULTS FOR AUTOMATIC METHOD [BEST RESULTS]
Metrics DR(%) FN rate (%) FP rate (%)
NAV 100 0 0
RSSI, NAV 100 0 0
NAV, Seq 99.800 0.199 0
NAV,TTL 100 0 0
RSSI,NAV,TTL 100 0 0.025
RSSI,Rate,NAV,TTL 100 0 0.025
RSSI,Rate,NAV,Seq,TTL 99.840 0.159 0.051
frames fails because the attacker has managed to emulate the
majority of the metrics based on the values of the legal frames.
APPENDIX A
Dempster-Shafer, as a theory of evidence method, is a dis-
cipline of mathematics that combines evidence of information
from multiple and heterogeneous events in order to calculate
the probability of occurrence of another event.
The D-S theory starts by assuming a Universe of Discourse
Θ = {θ1, θ2, . . . , θn}, also called a Frame of Discernment,
which is a finite set of all possible mutually exclusive propo-
sitions and hypotheses about some problem domain.
With regards to this work, the frame of discernment is
comprised of A = “Attack” and N = “Normal”. Assuming
Θ has two outcomes {A,N}, the total number of subsets of
Θ, defined by the number of hypotheses that it composes, is
2Θ = {A,N, {A|N},∅}
Each proposition (subset) from Θ is assigned a probability,
or a confidence interval within [0, 1], by an observer from
the mass probability function m (known as “basic probability
assignment”):
m : 2Θ → [0, 1] if

m(∅) = 0
m(A) ≥ 0,∀A ⊆ Θ∑
A⊆Θm(A) = 1
The function m(A) is defined as A’s basic probability
number. It describes the measure of belief that is committed
exactly to hypothesis A.
In order to define the confidence interval that is given to a
certain event, two functions must first be defined. These are
the Belief function (Bel) and the Plausibility function (Pl).
The former is a belief measure of a hypothesis A, and it sums
the mass value of all the non-empty subsets of A.
Bel(A) =
∑
B⊆A
m(B) ∀A ⊆ Θ
The doubt function (Dou) is given by
Dou(A) = Bel(¬A) = 1−
∑
B
⋂
A=∅
m(B)
which accounts for all evidence that rule out the given
proposition represented by A.
Similarly, the Pl function takes into account all the evidence
that does not rule out the given proposition. In other words,
it expresses how much we should believe in A if all currently
unknown facts were to support A.
Pl(A) = 1−Dou(A)
Thus, the true belief in hypothesis A will be along the
interval [Bel(A), P l(A)]. However, in practice, the values
of the interval could be identical and therefore the interval
becomes a unique value.
The idea behind the D-S rule of combination is to fuse the
belief from two different observers into one given hypothesis.
Let m1 and m2 be the basic probability assignments from
observer 1 and 2 respectively.
Their orthogonal sum, m = m1 ⊕m2, is defined as
m(A) =
∑
X
⋂
Y=Am1(X) ∗m2(Y )
1−∑X⋂Y=∅m1(X) ∗m2(Y ) when A 6= ∅
(1)
If the denominator of eq. (1) is equal to zero, K = 0, then
m1⊕m2 does not exist and m1 and m2 are said to be totally
or flatly contradictory. 
APPENDIX B
In previous work we have proposed three distinct method-
ologies for automatically assigning beliefs to each hypothesis,
based on a baseline profile of normal utilisation and without
intervention from the IDS administrator. One method generates
the belief in Attack, and a second method generates the belief
in Normal. Both work concurrently. Then, based on the belief
in Normal and Attack, a third method calculates a readjusted
belief for Uncertainty.
Two conditions must be met. Firstly, the number of legal
frames should be larger than malicious frames. Generally,
normal data is more predominant than malicious data in real
network traffic [18]. Secondly, the difference between the
metrics of legal and malicious frames must be statistically
differentiable and quantifiable.
1) Method to Assign Belief in Attack: The system first
calculates the reference of the n elements in the dataset and the
number of times the most repeated value (i.e. mode) appears
in the dataset, hereafter referred as Frequency F. Then, the
system calculates the angle α generated by the frequency and
the value with the largest distance (Dmax) from the reference
(see Fig. 5(b)). This angle α is used as a reference for the
maximum belief in Attack, which is set to 50%. This belief
for each of the hypotheses is calculated by dividing 100% by
the number of elements in the frame of discernment (in our
case 2). The angle α is given by: a = cos−1 F
(D2max+F
2)
1
2
.
For each new incoming frame, the system calculates the
angle β generated by F and the distance (D) of this value
from the reference. The angle β would be bounded by 0 and
α, 0 ≤ β ≤ α, where β = cos−1 F
(D2+F 2)
1
2
. Using a simple
linear function, the system assigns the belief in Attack for the
angle β generated by the current metric’s value.
β
α
D
Dmax
F
Metrics 
Value
Max Frame 
Value
Current Frame 
Value
Reference Frame 
Value
Fig. 5. Automatic BPA method for belief in Attack.
2) Method to Assign Belief in Normal: The methodology
proposed for assigning beliefs in Normal, is based on the
degree of dispersion of the values in the dataset. The system
makes use of quartiles, similar to the “box and whisker”
method [19], to create classes within the dataset and assigns a
fixed belief to each class. The metrics of each new incoming
frame are allocated whithin one of the classes. Depending on
the class that the current frame is allocated to, the system
assigns the belief in Normal.
If the value of the current frame coincides with the median
(Me), the belief is 50%. If the value is allocated between the
Q1 and Me, or Q3 and Me, the belief is 40%. Values between
Min and Q1, or Q3 and Max will acquire a belief of 30%.
The rest of the values will acquire a belief of 15%.
3) Method to Assign Belief in Uncertainty: A provisional
value is assigned to Uncertainty using a linear correlation
between the belief in Normal and Attack. As mentioned above,
the maximum possible belief corresponds to 0.5. So, for
calculating the belief in Uncertainty, the larger of both beliefs,
Normal and Attack, is adjusted to 50%. For instance, if the
belief in Normal and Attack are 0.4 and 0.497, respectively,
the value for Uncertainty would be: BeliefUnc. = 0.5 ∗
0.4/0.497 = 0.402.
In this example, the summation of all the beliefs is higher
than 1. This breaks one of the conditions of D-S theory:∑
H⊆Θm(H) = 1. Therefore, an adjustment value µ is
calculated as follows: µ = X−13 , where X is the summation
of the three beliefs. Continuing with the previous example,
X = 0.4+0.497+0.402 = 1.22. Then, the adjustment value is
µ = (1.229− 1)/3 = 0.099. Therefore, the beliefs in Normal,
Attack and Uncertainty are readjusted to 0.3, 0.397 and 0.303,
respectively. 
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